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Abstract
We investigate the equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation that are
based on individual actions only. Our approach is grounded in three simple and real-
istic principles: (1) Link formation should be a binary process of consent. (2) Link
formation should be costly. (3) The class of network payoﬀ functions should be as
general as possible.
It is accepted that these consent models have a very large number of equilibria.
However, until now no characterization of these equilibria has been established in the
literature. We aim to ﬁll this void and provide characterizations of stable networks or
the cases of two-sided and one-sided link formation costs. Furthermore, we provide a
comparison of Nash equilibria with potential maximizers for a certain speciﬁcation.
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Networks impact the way we behave, the information we receive, the communities we are
part of, and the opportunities that we pursue. They aﬀect the machinations of corporations,
the benevolence of non-proﬁt organizations, and the workings of the state. Two recent
overviews of the literature on statistical properties of large scale networks, Watts (2003)
and Newman (2003), discuss the relevance of networks for ﬁelds as diverse as physics,
social psychology, sociology, and biology. There has been a similar resurgence of interest
in economics to understand the phenomenon of network formation. A number of recent
contributions to the literature have recognized that networks play an important role in the
generation of economic gains for groups of decision makers. Diﬀerent network structures
usually lead to diﬀerent levels of generated gains, and network relationships between indi-
viduals have been interpreted in diﬀerent ways. Among others, for example, such relation-
ships could represent communication possibilities (Bala and Goyal 2000), trade relations
(Kranton and Minehart 2001), or authority relationships between superiors and subordi-
nates (van den Brink and Gilles 2003, Slikker, Gilles, Norde, and Tijs 2004).
In this paper we study two game-theoretic models of social network formation based
on individual actions only. Players in our framework are represented by nodes and their
social ties with others by links between these nodes. Nodes and links form together a
representationofasocialnetwork. Ourtheoryofsocialnetworkformationisbasedonthree
simple and realistic principles that govern most real-world networks: (1) Link formation
should be based on a binary process of consent. (2) Link formation should in principle be
costly. (3) The payoﬀ structure of network formation should be as general as possible.
We develop our approach from the hypothesis that creation of social ties requires some
prior interaction and, therefore, the process of link formation under mutual consent prin-
cipally occurs between social acquaintances. In the sociology literature it has been es-
tablished that social networks are indeed primarily formed between acquaintances. This
literature is founded on Granovetter (1973) and conﬁrmed empirically by Friedkin (1980),
Wellman, Carrington, and Hall (1988), and Tyler, Wilkinson, and Huberman (2003).1
Here we follow this line of reasoning and diﬀerentiate between familiarity among in-
dividuals, who can at best only be acquaintances, and the possibility of explicitly creating
a mutually beneﬁcial but costly relationship between the same individuals. This is in line
with Brueckner (2003), who categorically distinguishes the set of acquaintances a player
has, from the friendship links she establishes between them. This also places our approach
1More recently new methodologies have been developed to detect community structures in social net-
works for testing such hypotheses. We refer to Newman and Girvan (2004) and Newman (2004) for the
details of this methodology.
1within the context of Granovetter’s notion of strong social ties.
In our theory, the creation of a social tie or “link” requires the consent of both players
involved; the link between players i and j is only established when player j is willing to
accept the link initiated by player i or vice versa. As suggested by our second principle, we
emphasize that link formation is costly. Costs depend on the strategies chosen by the player
in the link formation process and are incurred independent of the outcome, i.e, even if a link
is not established the initiating player still has to pay for the act of trying to form that link.
We consider both two-sided and one-sided costs of link formation. In the ﬁrst model both
players bear an individually determined cost of link formation, while in the latter model we
distinguish between an “initiator” and a “respondent” in the link formation process with
only the initiator incurring the link formation cost. To meet our third requirement, we
consider a very general payoﬀ structure that has two components — an arbitrary beneﬁt
function corrected for additive link formation costs.2 We emphasize that beneﬁts depend
on the resulting network, and the costs on the link formation strategies chosen by the actors.
The process of network formation studied here is a generalization of the simple network
formation model developed by Myerson (1991, page 448). Following Myerson, we model
the link formation process as a normal form non-cooperative game. This model incorpo-
rates the fundamental idea that networks are the result of costly, consensual link formation
between pairs of players. We enhance this model by taking into account the three require-
ments discussed above. Since this model is rather well known in the literature, we call this
generalization of Myerson’s model the standard model of network formation.3
In the literature, the standard model often features in discussions on social network
formation but has been portrayed as being problematic since it is believed to have “too
many” Nash equilibria. (Jackson 2003, for example) However, until now there has been
made no attempt to provide a complete characterization of the set of these Nash equilibria
and our paper aims to ﬁll this void in the literature. Our characterization reveals that the
resulting networks have some appealing properties. Also, to abandon a realistic and elegant
model because it is not discerning enough in terms of its permissible equilibria seems
hardly justiﬁable.
In order to understand the importance of the ability to break (or deny) links in the process
of network formation we introduce a stability concept called link deletion proofness: a
2An arbitrary cost structure would require costs to be dependent on the outcome. The payoﬀ speciﬁcation
then would become game dependent forcing us to give up generality in the results. We believe that the
chosen payoﬀ structure based on arbitrary beneﬁts and additive link formation costs has the added advantage
of capturing what genuinely occurs in a realistic process of link formation.
3For other sources on the standard model we refer to Belleﬂamme and Bloch (2004), Bloch and Jackson
(2004), Calv´ o-Armengol and Ilkilic ¸ (2004), and Gilles, Chakrabarti, Sarangi, and Badasyan (2004).
2network is link deletion proof when players get a lower payoﬀ by deleting exactly one of
their established links. A variation called strong link deletion proofness allows players to
consider the simultaneous deletion of multiple links.
Subsequently we examine the relationship between the classes of networks satisfying
these stability concepts, and the set of networks resulting from the Nash equilibria of the
network formation game. The latter class is denoted as the set of individually stable net-
works. In general we ﬁnd that link deletion proofness and strong link deletion proofness are
equivalent if and only if network payoﬀs satisfy a convexity property. This network con-
vexity condition is weaker than the α-convexity condition introduced by Calv´ o-Armengol
and Ilkilic ¸ (2004).
Next we turn to the characterization of individually stable networks. For the case with
two-sided link formation costs we ﬁnd that a network is individually stable if and only if
it is strong link deletion proof. This result conﬁrms the well-accepted conjecture that there
are a multitude of Nash equilibria in network formation models under consent.
Finally, we study the one-sided cost model where only the link initiating player incurs a
cost. We ﬁnd that if a network is individually stable under two-sided link formation costs,
then it is also individually stable under one-sided link formation costs. The reverse does not
hold. Moreover, we ﬁnd that all strong link deletion proof networks are individually stable
while the converse does not hold. On the other hand, we provide a (partial) characterization
thatshowsthatindividuallystablenetworkscanbecapturedinaverylargeclassofpartially
stable networks. Again these insights conﬁrm the well-accepted conjecture that the class
of individually stable networks is extremely large and non-discerning.
We conclude our investigations with the analysis of a simple payoﬀ speciﬁcation based
on link-based network beneﬁts. This setting is used to investigate the relationship between
potential maximizers and Nash equilibria. We ﬁnd that the potential maximizer concept
is an useful reﬁnement of Nash equilibrium for the model with one-sided link formation
costs, contrary to the case of two-sided link formation costs.
Since the standard model of network formation is suﬃciently general it can incorporate
a number of existing network models. We ﬁrst point to the existence of individually stable
networks. Under two-sided link formation costs, it is possible to ﬁnd parallels in the liter-
ature on pairwise stability. This implies that the existence of individually stable networks
for the two-sided cost model is guaranteed for a large class of speciﬁcations. (Jackson and
Watts 2002) For the case of one-sided link formation costs, similar parallels can be drawn
with the Nash network formulation developed by Bala and Goyal (2000). In our frame-
work the ﬂow of beneﬁts is two-way, while only the initiating player incurs the cost of the
link in the one-sided case. Since giving consent to link formation under one-sided costs
3is costless, and under the Bala-Goyal type of speciﬁcation always yields positive beneﬁts,
the responding player would immediately consent to the link. Hence, existence of individ-
ually stable networks under one-sided link formation costs is guaranteed for a large class
of speciﬁcations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 of the paper provides nota-
tion and the model setup. Section 3 introduces the standard model of link formation under
consent and two-sided link formation costs. Section 4 discusses the case of one-sided link
formation costs. Section 5 elaborates on the interesting case of link-based network payoﬀs.
The proofs of the main results are relegated to Section 6.
2 Preliminaries and notation
In this section we introduce the basic concepts and notation pertaining to non-cooperative
games and networks.
2.1 Non-cooperative games
A non-cooperative game on the ﬁxed, ﬁnite player set N = {1,...,n} is given by a list
(Ai,πi)i∈N where for every player i ∈ N, Ai denotes an action set and πi: A → R denotes
player i’s payoﬀ function, where A = A1 × ··· × An is the set of action tuples. An in-
dividual action of player i ∈ N is denoted by ai ∈ Ai and an action tuple is written as
a = (a1,...,an) ∈ A. For every action tuple a ∈ A and player i ∈ N, we denote by
a−i = (a1,...,ai−1,ai+1,...,an) ∈ A−i =
Q
j,i Aj the actions selected by the players other
than i. In the rest of the paper we also denote a non-cooperative game on N for short by the
pair (A,π), where π = (π1,...,πn): A → RN is the composite payoﬀ function. In this paper
we only discuss ﬁnite non-cooperative games in the sense that for every i ∈ N the action
set Ai is ﬁnite.
An action ai ∈ Ai for player i ∈ N is called a best response to a−i ∈ A−i if for every
action bi ∈ Ai we have that πi(ai,a−i) > πi(bi,a−i). A best response ai to a−i is strict if
for every bi , ai we have that πi(ai,a−i) > πi(bi,a−i). An action tuple ˆ a ∈ A is a Nash
equilibrium of the game (A,π) if for every player i ∈ N
πi(ˆ a) > πi(bi, ˆ a−i) for every action bi ∈ Ai.
Hence, a Nash equilibrium ˆ a ∈ A satisﬁes the property that for every player i ∈ N the action
ˆ ai is a best response to ˆ a−i. A Nash equilibrium ˆ a ∈ A is called strict if for every player
i ∈ N the action ˆ ai is a strict best response to ˆ a−i.
4A function Q: A → R is a potential of the non-cooperative game (A,π) on the player set N
if for every player i ∈ N, action tuple a ∈ A and action bi ∈ Ai:
πi(a) − πi(bi,a−i) = Q(a) − Q(bi,a−i).
The notion of a potential game was introduced by Monderer and Shapley (1996) based on
the seminal work of Hart and Mas-Colell (1989). Monderer and Shapley (1996) proposed
the notion of a potential maximizer being an action tuple a ∈ A such that Q(a) > Q(b) for
every b ∈ A. The set of potential maximizers is denoted by PM(A,π) ⊂ A. It is obvious
that each potential maximizer is a Nash equilibrium and, hence, this notion is a reﬁnement
of the Nash equilibrium concept. Monderer and Shapley (1996) show that PM(A,π) , ∅
for every ﬁnite potential game (A,π) on N.
An alternative description of a potential game has been introduced by Ui (2000) as
follows. A coalition is any subset of players S ⊂ N and for a coalition S we denote by
AS =
Q
i∈S Ai its restricted action tuple set. A set of functions {ΦS : AS → R | S ⊂ N} is an





Ui showed that potentials and interaction potentials are essentially the same:
Lemma 2.1 (Ui 2000, Theorem 3) The game (A,π) has a potential Q: A → R if and only
if (A,π) possesses an interaction potential {ΦS | S ⊂ N}. Furthermore, for the latter case
a potential Q of the game (A,π) is given by Q(a) =
P
S⊂N ΦS(aS).
We will use these insights to analyze properties of certain speciﬁcations of network payoﬀs
in Section 5.
2.2 Networks
In our discussion of the foundations of the theory of networks we use established notation
from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), Dutta and Jackson (2003), and Jackson (2003). The
reader may refer to these sources for a more elaborated discussion.
We limit our discussion to non-directed networks on the player set N. In these networks
the two players making up a single link are essentially equal. Formally, if two players
i, j ∈ N with i , j are related we say that there exists a link between players i and j. We
use the notation ij to describe the binary link {i, j}.4 We deﬁne gN = {ij | i, j ∈ N, i , j} as
the set of all potential links.
4We reiterate that network relationships are non-directed, i.e., in this context ij = ji. However, for the
costs of establishing a link one may distinguish between the costs related to ij and the costs related to ji, i.e.,
possibly it holds that cij , cji.
5Any set of links g ⊂ gN now deﬁnes a network on N. We apply the convention that
g = gN is called the complete network and that g = g0 = ∅ is indicated as the empty
network. We denote by GN = {g | g ⊂ gN} the class of all networks on N.
The set of (direct) neighbors of a player i ∈ N in the network g is given by
Ni(g) = {j ∈ N | ij ∈ g}.
Similarly we introduce
Li(g) = {ij ∈ gN | j ∈ Ni(g)}
as the link set of player i in the network g. These are exactly the links with i’s direct
neighbors in g. We apply the convention that for every player i ∈ N we denote by Li =
Li(gN) = {ij | i , j} the set of all potential links involving player i.
For every pair of players i, j ∈ N with i , j we denote by g + ij = g ∪ {ij} the network
that results from adding the link ij to the network g. Similarly, g − ij = g \ {ij} denotes the
network resulting from removing the link ij from network g. More generally for any h ⊂ g
we let g − h = g \ h and for any h ⊂ gN with h ∩ g = ∅ we let g + h = g ∪ h.
Within a network, payoﬀs for the players are generated depending on how they are con-
nected to each other. This is represented by a “network payoﬀ function” for every player.
For player i ∈ N the function ϕi: GN → R denotes her network payoﬀ function which
assigns to every network g ⊂ gN a value ϕi(g) that is obtained by player i when she
participates in network g. The composite network payoﬀ function is now given by ϕ =
(ϕ1,...,ϕn): GN → RN. We emphasize that these payoﬀs can be zero, positive, or negative
and that the empty network g0 = ∅ generates (reservation) values ϕ(g0) ∈ RN that might be
non-zero as well.
Several examples of standard network payoﬀ functions for both noncooperative and
cooperative games are reviewed in Jackson (2003).5
2.3 Link-based stability concepts
We conclude the preliminaries on network theory with the deﬁnition and discussion of
several stability conditions. Note that the stability notions introduced below are based on
the properties of the network itself rather than strategic considerations of the players. This
latter viewpoint originates from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
5 We mention a speciﬁc class of network payoﬀ functions, which is investigated in van den Nouweland
(1993), Dutta, van den Nouweland, and Tijs (1998), Slikker (2000), Slikker and van den Nouweland (2000),
and Garratt and Qin (2003). There these network payoﬀ functions are deﬁned as allocation rules based on
underlying cooperative games. These papers extend the seminal contribution Myerson (1977) that set this
game-theoretic literature on network formation into motion.
6First we consider some auxiliary notation: Let ϕ: GN → RN be some network payoﬀ
function. For a given network g ∈ GN we now deﬁne the following concepts:
(a) For every ij ∈ G the marginal beneﬁt of the link ij in g is given by
D(g,ij) = ϕ(g) − ϕ(g − ij) ∈ R
N (1)
and for every player i ∈ N the marginal beneﬁt of ij ∈ Li(g) is thus given by
Di(g,ij) = ϕi(g) − ϕi(g − ij) ∈ R.
(b) For every player i ∈ N and link set h ⊂ Li(g) the marginal beneﬁt to player i of link
set h in g is given by
Di(g,h) = ϕi(g) − ϕi(g − h) ∈ R (2)
Using these additional tools we can give a precise description of the various link-based
stability concepts.
Deﬁnition 2.2 Let ϕ be a network payoﬀ function on the player set N.
(a) A network g ⊂ gN is link deletion proof if for every player i ∈ N and every j ∈ Ni(g)
it holds that Di(g,ij) > 0.
(b) A network g ⊂ gN is strong link deletion proof if for every player i ∈ N and every
h ⊂ Li(g) it holds that Di(g,h) > 0.
(c) A network g ⊂ gN is link addition proof if for all players i, j ∈ N: ϕi(g+ij) > ϕi(g)
implies ϕj(g + ij) < ϕj(g).
The two link deletion proofness notions are based on the severance of links in a network
by individual players. In particular, the notion of link deletion proofness considers the
stability of a network with regard to the deletion of a single link. Strong deletion proofness
considers the possibility that a player deletes any subset of her existing links. Clearly,
strong link deletion proofness implies link deletion proofness.
Similarly, link addition proofness considers the addition of a single link by two con-
senting players to an existing network. A network is link addition proof if for every pair of
non-linked players at least one of these two players has negative beneﬁts from the addition
of a link between them. Hence, there are no incentives to add any additional links to the
existing network.6
6Closely related to these basic stability concepts is the notion of pairwise stability seminally introduced
by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). Formally, a network is pairwise stable if it is link deletion proof as well as
link addition proof.
7We denote by L(ϕ) ⊂ GN the family of link deletion proof networks for ϕ. Similarly,
we let Ls(ϕ) ⊂ GN be the family of strong link deletion proof networks for ϕ.
Next we state the precise conditions under which link deletion proofness and strong
link deletion proofness are equivalent.
Deﬁnition 2.3 For a player i ∈ N the network payoﬀ function ϕi: GN → R is network
convex on the network g ∈ GN if for every link set h ⊂ Li(g) we have that
X
ij∈h
Di(g,ij) > 0 implies Di(g,h) > 0.
Thefollowingresultjustiﬁestheintroductionofthisnetworkconvexityproperty. Itcorrects
the assertion that the equivalence of strong pairwise stability and pairwise stability holds if
and only if π satisﬁes α-convexity. (Calv´ o-Armengol and Ilkilic ¸ 2004, Theorem 1)
Proposition 2.4 Let ϕ be some network payoﬀ structure on GN. Then Ls(ϕ) = L(ϕ) if and
only if for every player i ∈ N the network payoﬀ function ϕi is network convex on every link
deletion proof network g ∈ L(ϕ).
For a proof of this assertion we refer to Section 6.
Example 2.5 We conclude our discussion with an example which delineates the diﬀerent
link-wise stability concepts and shows a situation in which link deletion proofness and
strong link deletion proofness lead to diﬀerent results.
Consider the network payoﬀs given in the following table:
Network ϕ1(g) ϕ2(g) ϕ3(g) Stability
g0 = ∅ 0 0 0 Ls
g1 = {12} −1 −1 −1
g2 = {13} −1 −1 −1
g3 = {23} 5 3 3 Ls
g4 = {12,13} 1 1 1 Ls
g5 = {12,23} 0 4 0
g6 = {13,23} 0 0 4
g7 = gN 1 5 5 L
In the table L stands for link deletion proofness and Ls for strong link deletion proofness.
The main feature here is that network g7 is link deletion proof, but not strong link deletion
proof. To make the diﬀerences between the various possibilities more clear we provide an
overview of the marginal beneﬁts:
8Network D(g,12) D(g,13) D(g,23)
g0 = ∅ — — —
g1 = {12} −1,−1,−1 — —
g2 = {13} — −1,−1,−1 —
g3 = {23} — — 5,3,3
g4 = {12,13} 2,2,2 2,2,2 —
g5 = {12,23} −5,1,−3 — 0,4,0
g6 = {13,23} — −5,−3,1 0,0,4
g7 = gN 1,5,1 1,1,5 0,3,3
Note that D(g7,12) + D(g7,13) = (2,6,6) and that D(g7,{12,13}) = (−4,2,2). Hence, the
case of the removal of the links 12 and 13 from network g7 shows that ϕ is not network
convex.
In g7 player 1 is stuck with bad company if she could delete only a single link at the time;
she would like to break links with both players 2 and 3 and improve her payoﬀ from 1
unit to 5 units. However, deleting either of these two links separately would make her only
worse oﬀ. In this regard network convexity requires that no player is in such a bad company
situation. 
3 Two-sided link formation costs
In this section we present the ﬁrst of two game-theoretic models of costly network forma-
tion. Let N = {1,...,n} be a given set of players and ϕ: GN → RN be a ﬁxed, but arbitrary
network payoﬀ function representing the gross beneﬁts that accrue to the players in a net-
work. For every player i ∈ N we introduce individualized link formation costs represented
by ci = (cij)j,i ∈ R
N\{i}
+ . (Recall that for some links ij ∈ gN it might hold that cij , cji.) Thus,
the pair hϕ,ci represents the basic payoﬀs and costs of network formation to the individuals
in N.
A simple, fundamental model of network formation has been introduced by Myerson
(1991, page 448) and is based on the idea that pairs of players approach each other on equal
footing and both have to consent to form a link. Myerson (1991) based the beneﬁts from
network formation on an underlying cooperative game.7 Here we extend this framework
further to incorporate costs of link formation for arbitrary network payoﬀ functions. We
model link formation costs in two ways: Costs can be two-sided, i.e., both players incur
costs while approaching each other to form a link, or costs can be one-sided. In the latter
case costs are only incurred by the initiating player, not the responding player.
7This cooperative beneﬁts model has been extended by Slikker and van den Nouweland (2000) and Gar-
ratt and Qin (2003) to incorporate link formation costs. Their formulation only allowed them to develop a
complete and exhaustive description of the resulting networks for situations with up to four individuals.
9We ﬁrst address the formalization of the standard model with two-sided link formation
costs. For every player i ∈ N we introduce an action set
A
a
i = {(`ij)j,i | `ij ∈ {0,1}} (3)
Player i seeks contact with player j if `ij = 1. A link is formed if both players seek contact,




i where ` ∈ Aa. Then the resulting network is given by
g
a(`) = {ij ∈ gN | `ij = `ji = 1}. (4)
Link formation is costly. Approaching player j to form a link costs player i an amount







`ij · cij (5)




Now a network g ∈ GN is called individually stable under two-sided link formation
costs if there exists a Nash equilibrium action tuple ˆ ` ∈ Aa in the standard model with two-
sided link formation costs (Aa,πa) such that ga 
ˆ `

= g. Hence, individually stable networks
are those networks supported through Nash equilibrium strategies.
We are able to provide a complete characterization of individual stability under two-
sided link formation costs.
Proposition 3.1 Let ϕ and c > 0 be given as above. A network g ⊂ gN is individually
stable under two-sided link formation costs if and only if g is strong link deletion proof for
the net payoﬀ function ϕa given by
ϕ
a




For a proof of this result we refer to Section 6.
Proposition 3.1 gives a complete characterization of the individually stable networks in
the standard model with two-sided costs of link formation. Note that regardless of the cost
structure, the empty network is always individually stable. The next corollary strengthens
this insight by showing that the empty network is actually “strictly” individually stable for
positive costs.
10Corollary 3.2 If c  0, then the empty network is supported by a strict Nash equilibrium
of the standard model with two-sided link formation costs.
Proof. First, for every i ∈ N and ` ∈ Aa we deﬁne hi(`) = {ij ∈ gN | `ij = 1 and `ji = 0}.
We now show that `∅ is a strict Nash equilibrium in the game (Aa,πa), where `∅
ij = 0 for all

























, ∅. Hence, we may conclude that indeed `∅ is a strict Nash equilibrium
in the link formation game (Aa,πa).
From Corollary 3.2 it should be clear that if players start from the empty network and link
formation costs are positive, then there is no reason to form any links.
Dutta, van den Nouweland, and Tijs (1998) showed that in the cooperative beneﬁts
model under costless link formation, every network is individually stable if the network
payoﬀ function is “link monotonic”. Proposition 3.1 generalizes this insight for situations
with arbitrary network payoﬀ functions. This is stated in the next corollary which proof is
immediate from Proposition 3.1.
Corollary 3.3 Assume that ϕ is link monotonic in the sense that ϕi(g) < ϕi(g + ij) for all
networks g and players i ∈ N with ij < g where j , i. If c = 0, then every network is
individually stable.
4 One-sided link formation costs
Next we address the formalization of the standard model with one-sided link formation
costs. Here links are formed by mutual agreement, but one player initiates the formation
process and the other player responds to it. The initiator incurs the formation costs of the
link, while the respondent incurs no costs.8 Hence, a diﬀerent strategy space is called for.
Formally, for every player i ∈ N we introduce an action set
A
b
i = {(`ij,rij)j,i | `ij,rij ∈ {0,1}}. (6)
Player i acts as the initiator in forming a link with player j if `ij = 1. Player j responds
positively to this initiative if rji = 1. A link is established if formation is initiated and
accepted, i.e., if `ij = rji = 1. This is formalized as follows.
8We remark that a similar link formation structure has been already discussed by Slikker (2000) and





i. Given the link formation procedure described, for any (`,r) ∈ Ab,
the resulting network is now given by
g
b(`,r) = {ij ∈ gN | `ij = rji = 1}. (7)
When player i initiates the formation of a link with player j she incurs a cost of cij > 0.
Responding to the initiative by another player however, is costless. This results in the







`ij · cij (8)
where c denotes the link formation costs.
Analogous to the previous model with two-sided link formation costs, the pair hϕ,ci
generates the non-cooperative game (Ab,πb) introduced above. This game represents the
standard model with one-sided link formation costs.
Like before, a network g ∈ GN is called individually stable under one-sided link forma-
tion costs if there exists a Nash equilibrium action tuple

ˆ `, ˆ r

∈ Ab in the standard model
with one-sided link formation costs (Ab,πb) such that gb 
ˆ `, ˆ r

= g.
The next example discusses the simplest possible case of a single link between two
players that illustrates the multitude of individually stable networks under one-sided link
formation costs.
Example 4.1 Let N = {1,2}. Hence, we have two possible networks, g0 = ∅ and gN =
{12}. Consider the network payoﬀ function ϕ given by ϕ1(g0) = ϕ2(g0) = 0, ϕ1(gN) = 10,
and ϕ2(gN) = 5. We now consider the following (equal) cost structures:
(a) c12 = c21 ∈ [0,5]
In these cases the class of individually stable networks is the same for one-sided
and two-sided link formation costs, namely both feasible networks g0 and gN.
(b) c12 = c21 ∈ (5,10]
In these cases, under two-sided link formation costs, only the empty network g0 is
individually stable. However, under one-sided link formation costs, again both g0
and gN are individually stable. Indeed, the complete network gN is supported by
strategy proﬁles with `12 = 1, r21 = 1, and `21 = 0.
These two cases illustrate the main diﬀerences between two-sided and one-sided link for-
mation costs. In particular it shows that under one-sided costs there are more individually
stable networks. 
12The next result generalizes the insight of Example 4.1. For a proof of this proposition we
refer to Section 6 of the paper.
Proposition 4.2 Let ϕ and c > 0 be given. Any individually stable network under two-
sided link formation costs is individually stable under one-sided link formation costs.
Example 4.1 for link formation costs in the range (5,10] shows that the assertion stated in
Proposition 4.2 cannot be reversed.
In Proposition 3.1 we characterized the class of individually stable networks under two-
sided link formation costs. However, such a complete characterization is not possible with
one-sided link formation costs. Instead we provide two inclusions that show the largeness
of the set of individually stable networks under one-sided link formation costs.
Proposition 4.3 Let ϕ be arbitrary and let c > 0 be such that cij , cji for all potential links
ij ∈ gN.








then g is individually stable under one-sided link formation costs.
(b) If g ⊂ gN is individually stable under one-sided link formation costs, then for all
links ij ∈ g it holds that
Di(g,ij) > cij or Dj(g,ij) > cji.
The assertion of Proposition 4.3(a) is proved in Section 6. Proposition 4.3(b) is a rather
straightforward application of the deﬁnition of the marginal payoﬀs and individual stability
under one-sided link formation costs. A formal proof of this assertion is therefore omitted
and left to the reader.
The next example demonstrates that Proposition 4.3(a) cannot be reversed.
Example 4.4 Again consider N = {1,2}. As before we let g0 = ∅ and gN = {12} with
ϕ1(g0) = ϕ2(g0) = 0, ϕ1(gN) = 1, and ϕ2(gN) = 10. We consider two diﬀerent cost
structures:
(a) Consider c12 = 2 < c21 = 5.
Now both g0 and gN are individually stable under one-sided link formation costs,
13but gN is not link deletion proof for ϕb.
Indeed a Nash equilibrium for the standard model with one-sided link formation
costs supporting gN is given by `12 = 0, r12 = 1, `21 = 1, and r21 = 0. Now,
gb(`,r) = gN, πb
1(`,r) = 1 > 0 = ϕ1(g0), and πb
2(`,r) = 5 > 0 = ϕ2(g0). However,
ϕb
1(gN) = −1 < ϕb
1(g0) = 0, which implies that gN is not link deletion proof with
respect to ϕb for player 1.
(b) Consider c12 = 11 > c21 = 5.
In this case again both g0 and gN are individually stable under one-sided link forma-
tion costs. However, in this case the inclusion stated in Proposition 4.3(a) is tight.








1(gN) = 1 − 0 = 1
ϕ
b
2(gN) = 10 − 5 = 5
Hence, both g0 and gN are strong link deletion proof with respect to ϕb. This con-
ﬁrms that in this case the inclusion stated in Proposition 4.3(a) is indeed tight.
Case (a) demonstrates a form of ineﬃciency in link formation, since in equilibrium higher
than necessary costs are incurred. This implies that outside regulation of link formation
processes — in the sense that an outside regulator determines who initiates which link —
will restore eﬃciency. In this example, player 1 should be forced to initiate the link with
player 2. 
With regard to the possibility of the tightness of the inclusion stated in Proposition 4.3(b)
we refer to Example 4.1. There it has been shown that the collection of individually stable
networks under one-sided link formation costs is exactly equal to the class of networks
indicated in 4.3(b) for any cost structure. We refer to Section 5.2 for the discussion of
another class of network payoﬀ structures for which this inclusion is tight.
5 Equilibria and potential maximizers
Thus far we only considered network formation using arbitrary (network) payoﬀ functions
that do not rely on speciﬁc payoﬀ structures or even on explicit formulations. In this section
we develop the case of link-based network payoﬀs. We use this straightforward model to
illustrate some interesting properties and arrive at some startling conclusions.
We ﬁrst develop a simple formulation of link-based payoﬀ generation. For that purpose
we introduce θi: Li → R+ as a link beneﬁt function for player i ∈ N that assigns to every
14potential link ij ∈ Li of player i a beneﬁt θi(ij) > 0. Next we deﬁne the network payoﬀ
function Θi: GN → R+ with Θi(g) =
P
j∈Ni(g) θi(ij), where θi is the link beneﬁt function for
player i. The resulting network payoﬀ function Θ is called a link-based network payoﬀ
function.
In this simple model, beneﬁts are only generated from the direct links of a certain
individual with other individuals. There are no beneﬁts from being connected to players
beyond one’s direct neighbors in the network. Thus, there are no spillovers in the network.
The most immediate example of such link-based payoﬀs are proﬁts generated by trade
relationships between buyers and sellers in a market.
We investigate the properties of this link-based network payoﬀ structure to illustrate the
relationships between the diﬀerent concepts. The link-based payoﬀ structure in this appli-
cation reﬂects in particular the beneﬁts obtained from having links with direct neighbors.
Interestingly this simple payoﬀ structure is shown to have some insightful properties.
5.1 Two-sided link formation costs
First we discuss link-based beneﬁts in the setting of the standard model with two-sided link
formation costs. It turns out that this particular case has some interesting and illustrative
properties.
Claim 5.1 Consider the link-based network payoﬀ function Θ based on the link beneﬁt
functions θi: Li → R+. Let c > 0 be the link formation cost parameter.
For network payoﬀ function Θ the individually stable networks with two-sided link forma-
tion costs are given by g ⊂ {ij ∈ gN | min{θi(ij),θj(ij)} > max{cij,cji}}.
In other words, individually stable networks consist of links for which the formation costs
are covered by their direct beneﬁts. This is exactly as one would expect within this setting.
The properties of the link-based network payoﬀ functions also include a relationship
with potential games. This is the subject of our next proposition. We remark that we
call the link-based beneﬁt structure mutual if there exists a link-based beneﬁt function
θ: gN → R+ such that θi(ij) = θj(ij) = θ(ij) for all players i, j ∈ N with i , j. We are able
to show that mutual link-based beneﬁts generate a potential game.
Proposition 5.2 If for every player i ∈ N the link-based network payoﬀ function Θi(g) =
P
ij∈Li(g) θ(ij) is founded on a mutual link beneﬁt function θ: gN → R+, then the standard
model with two-sided link formation costs is a potential game.
Furthermore, in this game the potential maximizing individually stable networks are given
by g =b gθ ∪ h, whereb gθ = {ij ∈ gN | θ(ij) > cij + cji} and h ⊂ {ij ∈ gN | θ(ij) = cij + cji}.
15Proof. We proceed by constructing an appropriate interaction potential for the standard
model with two-sided link formation costs. By application of Lemma 2.1 it then is estab-
lished that this model has a potential.
Let ` ∈ Aa. We now introduce an interaction potential for every coalition S ⊂ N by
ΦS(`S) =

     
     
−
P
j,i `ij · cij if S = {i}
`ij · `ji · θ(ij) if S = {i, j}
0 otherwise
Observe that this is indeed an interaction potential. The function Φ{i}(`i) depends only on







(θ(ij) − cij) −
X
j<Nd(i,ga(`))




`ij · `ji · θ(ij) −
X
j,i






















`ij · cij + `ji · cji
i
.
Hence, Q is maximal if ga(`) =b gθ ∪ h with h ⊂ {ij ∈ gN | θ(ij) = cij + cji}.
From Proposition 5.2 and the previous discussion of Proposition 3.1 and Corollary 3.2, we
can draw some important conclusions.
First, in game theory the set of potential maximizers is usually considered to be an
important and useful reﬁnement of the Nash equilibrium concept. (More speciﬁcally,
we refer to Slikker, Dutta, van den Nouweland, and Tijs (2000) for the relationship be-
tween network formation and potential maximizers.) Proposition 5.2, however, shows
that for mutual link-based beneﬁts and two-sided link formation costs, the set of poten-
tial maximizing networks may not be the most interesting class of networks. Indeed,
for mutual link-based network payoﬀs, the largest individually stable network is given
by g?
θ = {ij ∈ gN | θ(ij) > max{cij,cji}}. The class of networks identiﬁed in Proposition
5.2 does not contain this network. Contrary, this class of networks, in fact, does not have
any signiﬁcantly distinguishing features. It is clear that we have to resort to other modiﬁ-
cations of the Nash equilibrium concept in our study of the formation of non-trivial stable
networks.
16Second, Monderer and Shapley (1996) introduced the notion of an “improvement path”
to describe an individually myopic improvement process that results in a Nash equilibrium
for a potential game. In the context of the model addressed in Proposition 5.2 such pro-
cesses are less useful. In particular, starting from the empty network — as the most natural
starting point — these improvement paths terminate immediately, thus, rendering the dis-
cussion rather pointless. It is apparent that other behavioral rules besides individually my-
opic behavior have to be introduced in the analysis to support the formation of non-trivial
stable networks. Nevertheless, we remark that individual stability of a network remains a
basic requirement for the outcome of any game theoretic network formation process.
5.2 One-sided link formation costs
In this section we consider the case of one-sided link formation costs for any link-based
network payoﬀ function Θ introduced above.
Claim 5.3 Consider the link-based network payoﬀ function Θ based on the link beneﬁt
functions θi: Li → R+. Let c > 0 be the link formation cost parameter.
For network payoﬀ function Θ the individually stable networks under one-sided link for-
mation costs are given by g ⊂ {ij ∈ gN | θi(ij) > cij or θj(ij) > cji}.
From this claim and the previous analysis it follows immediately that with link-based net-
workpayoﬀs, theclassofindividuallystablenetworksundertwo-sidedlinkformationcosts
is a strict subset of the class of individually stable networks under one-sided link formation
costs. The claim also shows that the inclusion stated in Proposition 4.3(b) is tight in this
case of link-based network beneﬁts.
In Proposition 5.2 we discussed the class of potential maximizing networks for mutual
link-based beneﬁts and two-sided link formation costs. Here we present an analogue of
that case for one-sided link formation costs.
Proposition 5.4 If for every i ∈ N the mutual link-based network payoﬀ function Θi(g) =
P
j∈Ni(g) θ(ij) is founded on the mutual link beneﬁt function θ: gN → R+, then the standard
model with one-sided link formation costs is a potential game.
Moreover, in this case the potential maximizing individually stable networks are given by
g = e gθ ∪ h, wheree gθ = {ij ∈ gN | θ(ij) > min{cij,cji}} and h ⊂ {ij ∈ gN | θ(ij) = min{cij,cji}}.
Proof. Again we proceed by constructing an appropriate interaction potential. By applica-
tion of Lemma 2.1 it is then established that this model has a potential.




     
     
−
P
j∈Ni(g) `ij · cij if S = {i}
mij(`,r) · θ(ij) if S = {i, j}
0 otherwise,
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[`ij · cij + `ji · cji].
From this it is clear that Q is maximal if ga(`) = e gθ ∪ h with h ⊂ {ij ∈ gN | θ(ij) =
min{cij,cji}}.
Compared to the conclusion in Proposition 5.2 the assertion of Proposition 5.4 is much
more interesting. It identiﬁes exactly the class of networks that result from the formation of
each proﬁtable link, i.e., when link formation is proﬁtable for the individual with the lowest
link costs, the link is always formed. Hence, we conclude that the potential maximizer as
a reﬁnement of Nash equilibrium, is a more useful tool in explaining the formation of
non-trivial networks in the context of one-sided link formation costs.
5.3 Some lessons from our analysis
We ﬁnd an interesting contrast between the two-sided and one-sided link formation costs
for the case of link-based network beneﬁts. On the one hand, in general, all equilibria
of the two-sided model are also equilibria in the one-sided model. (Proposition 4.2) On
the other hand, the example of mutual link-based network beneﬁts (Propositions 5.2 and
5.4) in which all beneﬁts are derived only from direct links, provides interesting additional
insights. Under two-sided costs we ﬁnd that the potential maximizer is not a useful solution
concept since it requires that individual payoﬀs (stemming from individual actions) must
cover the link costs of both agents. Yet for one-sided costs the potential maximizer is able
18to select the right Nash equilibria since in this case the potential function takes correctly
into account the actions and costs of individual players only.
Our analysis also points to some questions that are worth investigating further. In this
section we investigated a particular example of link-based network payoﬀs. Can we extend
this class of payoﬀ functions to a more general family with similar properties? Especially it
would be interesting to identify larger classes of network payoﬀ functions that generate po-
tential functions within the setting of link formation games. We refer to Durieu, Haller, and
Solal (2004) for the discussion of a more general setting in which beneﬁts are principally
link-based. In that case the network formation game also has a potential.
6 Proofs of the main results
6.1 Proof of Proposition 2.4
Obviously from the deﬁnitions it follows that in general Ls(ϕ) ⊂ L(ϕ).
Only if: Suppose that g ∈ L(ϕ) and that ϕi is not network convex on g for some i ∈ N and
some link set h ⊂ Li(g). We show that g < Ls(ϕ).
Indeed, from the hypothesis that g is link deletion proof, we know that Di(g,ij) > 0 for
every ij ∈ Li(g). Then for h it has to be true that since
P
h Di(g,ij) > 0, Di(g,h) < 0. But
then this implies that player i would prefer to sever all links in h. Hence, g cannot be strong
link deletion proof, i.e., g < Ls(ϕ).
If: Let g ∈ L(ϕ) and assume that ϕ is network convex on g. Then for every player i ∈ N
and link ij ∈ Li(g) it has to hold that Di(g,ij) > 0 due to link deletion proofness of g. In
particular, for any link set h ⊂ Li(g):
P
h Di(g,·) > 0. Now by network convexity this
implies that Di(g,h) > 0 for every link set h ⊂ Li(g). In other words, g is strong link
deletion proof, i.e., g ∈ Ls(ϕ).
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.4.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1
If. Suppose that g ⊂ gN is strong deletion proof with respect to the given payoﬀ function
ϕa. Deﬁne `g ∈ Aa by `
g
ij = 1 if and only if ij ∈ g. Now ga(`g) = g. We now show that `g is
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g
i and deﬁne hi = {ij ∈ gN | `
g
ij = 1 and lij = 0}. Then it follows that hi = {ij ∈ g |
lij = 0} and ga(li,`
g
−i) = g \ hi. From this, equation (9), and strong link deletion proofness












Only if. Suppose that g is individually stable. Then, with the deﬁnitions above, `g is a Nash
equilibrium in (Aa,πa). Let M ⊂ Ni(g) and let hM = {ij ∈ g | j ∈ M} be the set of all links






1 if ij ∈ g \ hM;
0 otherwise.

















From this it can be concluded that g is indeed strong link deletion proof.
This completes the proof of Proposition 3.1.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Letb ` ∈ Aa be a Nash equilibrium strategy tuple in the standard model with two-sided link
formation costs. We construct withb ` a strategy tuple in the standard model with one-sided
link formation generating exactly the same network ga(b `) and show that this is a Nash
equilibrium in the model with one-sided link formation costs.9
First we remark that by the Nash equilibrium requirements onb ` without loss of generality
we may assume that for any ij ∈ gN eitherb `ij = b `ji = 1, orb `ij = b `ji = 0. In the ﬁrst case we
have that ij ∈ ga(b `) and in the second case we have that ij < ga(b `).
Forb ` we deﬁne (`,r) ∈ Ab such that
(A) `ij = 1 and rij = 0 if and only ifb `ij = b `ji = 1 and
• cij < cji, or
• cij = cji and i < j.
(B) `ij = 0 and rij = 1 if and only ifb `ij = b `ji = 1 and
9The cases excluded here are for cij = 0 and/or cji = 0. These cases are trivial aznd no explicit analysis is
required.
20• cij > cji, or
• cij = cji and i > j.
(C) `ij = rij = 0 if and only ifb `ij = b `ji = 0.
So, (`,r) ∈ Ab describes that the lowest link formation cost is paid for the formation of
every link ij ∈ ga(b `) = gb(`,r).
We now show that (`,r) is indeed a Nash equilibrium of the standard model with one-sided
link formation costs.
Let (Li,Ri) ∈ Ab
i be such that (Li,Ri) , (`i,ri). Now we deﬁne ˆ Lij = 1 if and only if Lij = 1
or Rij = rij = 1. Otherwise ˆ Lij = 0.
Now it holds that ij ∈ ga(b `−i, ˆ Li) if and only ifb `ij = ˆ Lij = 1 if and only if
1. `ij = Lij = 1,
2. rji = Lij = 1, or
3. rij = Rij = `ji = 1.
Case1impliesthatij < gb(`−i,r−i;Li,Ri), whilecases2and3implythatij ∈ gb(`−i,r−i;Li.Ri).




a(b `−i, ˆ Li) ⊂ g
a(b `). (10)



























`ij · cij −
X
j,i
rij · cij +
X
j,i





`ij · cij = π
b
i(`,r),
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from Proposition 3.1 and (10). The second inequality
follows from the fact that
P
j,i rij · cij >
P
j,i Rij · rij · cij.
The above shows that (`,r) indeed is a Nash equilibrium with regard to the payoﬀ function
πb. Thus, ga(b `) is supported as a individually stable network in the standard model with
one-sided link formation costs.
This completes the proof of Proposition 4.2.
216.4 Proof of Proposition 4.3(a)
Let g be a strong link deletion proof network under the net payoﬀ function ϕb.




ji = 1 if ij ∈ g and




ji = 0 otherwise.
It is clear that (`g,rg) describes the cost minimizing link formation scheme that supports g,




















Let (Li,Ri) ∈ Ab




i ). We now deﬁne
M = {j ∈ Ni(g) | Lij = r
g
ij = 0} ∪ {j ∈ Ni(g) | Rij = `
g
ij = 0} , ∅.




−i;Li,Ri) = g \ hM.
From the properties of (`g,rg) and the above it follows that j ∈ Nd(i,g \ hM) if and only if
[Lij = `
g
ij = 1 and r
g
ij = 0] or [Rij = r
g
ij = 1 and `
g
ij = 0]. In the ﬁrst case cij < cji and in the
latter cij > cji.
From this it follows that
X
j∈Nd(i,g\hM)



















Lij · cij 6
6 ϕi(g \ hM) −
X
j∈Nd(i,g\hM)
Lij · cij 6











where the second inequality follows from (11) and the third inequality from the hypothesis
that g is strong link deletion proof with respect to ϕb.
Since this holds for all i ∈ N we conclude that (`g,rg) is indeed a Nash equilibrium in
(Ab,πb).
This completes the proof of Proposition 4.3(a).
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